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Judicial Independence: New Challenges in
Established Nations
MARTIN SHAPIRO*
ABSTRACT

Because courts are both conflict-resolving and lawmaking bodies,
they should be both independent and accountable. This paradox of
incidence and accountability cannot be resolved but only addressed by
various and shifting pragmatic accommodations between independence
and accountability. Prosecutors, trial courts, appeals courts, and
constitutional courts are each subject to differing consideration in
arrivingat such accommodations.
Moreover, courts, as courts of law, are not independent but are
agents of statutory and constitutional lawmakers. Excessive emphasis on
judicial independence creates the danger that authoritarianregimes may
achieve a cloak of legitimacy for their laws by having them enforced by
independent judiciaries.
INTRODUCTION

Among a number of global quests in search of the rule of law, due
process, and legal protection of human rights has been the quest for
judicial independence. The banner of independence is waved by the
right as a protection for investors and property more generally, by the
left as essential for the judicial protection of human rights, and by
champions of constitutional judicial review, as a constitutional court
without independence would be a mere fagade. Yet things are not so
simple. Judicial independence is as much a problem as a solution.' The
* Professor of Law, Emeritus; School of Law, University of California, Berkeley;
Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. B.A., UCLA 1955; Ph.D, Harvard University
1961.
1. See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001); G. ALAN
TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE STATES (2012); THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND
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central task of judges is to resolve disputes. Independence is essential to
the success of that mission. Judges, however, do not only resolve
disputes. Judicial courts are "courts of law" that resolve disputes
according to the law. To settle disputes judges must indubitably
interpret what the law is. Whoever interprets the law or says what a
legal text means, to some degree, at some times, and under some
circumstances, makes the law. If judges make law, they must not be
absolutely independent. They must be accountable to someone, at least
according to any political theory currently at play in the politically
developed world. Once independence and accountability are seen as two
sides of the judicial coin, answers to questions about how independent
courts should be are not so simple. Independence and accountability
constitute an antinomy subject to pragmatic compromise rather than
simple answers. The politically developed nations have devised various
2
compromises, but none of them are completely satisfactory.
Particularly, when mixed groups of Anglo-American and civil law
scholars discuss judicial independence, they tend to conflate and confuse
a number of different conceptions of judicial office and function. Some
additional clarity, if not resolution of this confusion, may be gained by
carefully distinguishing between the various and sometimes differing
functions labeled "judicial" in various legal systems.
I. THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS
One of the great divides between Anglo-American and civil law
systems involves criminal investigation and prosecution. Although
subject to various modifications and reforms, in civil law systems the
development of the investigative record leading to prosecution and the
decision whether to prosecute typically lies in the hands of government
officers who are labeled judges. In some instances these officers rotate
between judicial duties and those of investigation and prosecution, and
in other instances the officers are separated from the rest of the
judiciary, but nonetheless hold a judicial title. In common law systems,
criminal investigation and prosecution are never in the hands of judges.
Looking more closely at pretrial activity, sometimes labeled judicial
activity, we discover a number of different functions that raise
somewhat diverse issues of judicial independence. First is the decision
THE

PUBLIC

(Bruce

Peabody

ed.,

2011);

MITCHEL

A.

SOLLENBERGER,

JUDICIAL

APPOINTMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS (2011); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and DemocraticAccountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 79 (1998).
2. See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH, supra note 1.
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to prosecute, which rests in part on an assessment of whether there is
sufficient evidence against the accused to make it reasonably likely that
he would be found guilty in a trial. This assessment is essentially
"judicial" in the sense that it involves the prosecutor weighing the
evidence for and against the suspect and anticipating the decision of the
trial judge or jury, using the same standards of admissibility and proof
that they would use in a trial. 3 Indeed, in theory at least, while the
prosecutor may be making a decision fraught with uncertainty, it is not
a discretionary decision. If there is sufficient weight of evidence to
justify a conviction, the prosecutor has a legal duty to prosecute.
Because the decision to prosecute is judicial in this sense, it is generally
considered that it ought to be independent.
In reality, however, the decision to prosecute inevitably also rests on
balancing the investigation and litigation resources available to the
prosecutor against the demands that are made on those resources. Few
societies are willing to devote the necessary amount of public resources
to properly prepare and carry out the prosecution of every criminal act
that could reasonably be assigned to a particular suspect. Prosecution
involves priorities and the assignment of limited resources so as to
optimize, but not fully achieve, public purposes or policies. Thus, the
decision whether to prosecute is not fully, or solely, judicial, but is, to
some degree, executive. It rests not only on the perceived guilt or
innocence of the accused, but on the relative importance to the
achievement of crime control of pursuing one particular prosecution
rather than others. Such a decision about allocation of organizational
resources is essentially executive, rather than judicial, and because
those resources are public and devoted to public purposes, they are
essentially political. This is why common law systems use election or
political appointment of prosecutors.
Finally, the decision to prosecute involves not only who to prosecute
but what sentence to seek-that is, what crime to charge and what level
of punishment to seek. In theory, these prosecutorial choices in civil law
systems are not discretionary but dictated in the same way judges' and
juries' decisions are-by the weight of the admissible evidence.
However, the reality is that scarcity of prosecutorial resources and the
uncertainties of predicting actual trial court outcomes inevitably lead to
some level of charge or sentence plea bargaining between the prosecutor
and the defendant. Also, the degree to which considerations of
organizational resources, goals, and prestige are at play in such

3. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004
Wis. L. REv. 837 (2004) (discussing the role prosecutorial discretion plays in criminal law
enforcement).
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prosecutorial bargaining might reasonably be said to be executive
rather than judicial.
II. THE ROLE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGES
If we move from prosecutors labeled as judges to actual trial court
judges, the nature of discretion and the balance between discretion and
legally predetermined decisions changes. While admitting all of the
unavoidable human elements that the judicial realists taught us enter
into judicial decisions, surely the decision of guilt, innocence, or other
legal culpability is supposed to be law driven rather than discretionary.
Judges, however, also make a great many procedural decisions often
decisive to trial court outcomes. In some sense, many of these decisions
are discretionary, involving close calls as to what the law demands.
However, these decisions remain largely judicial in the sense that they
are decisions about what the law requires even when the law's demand
may only be "fairness." The trial judge in both jury and nonjury systems
is the very prototype of a judge, the guardian and applier of the law to a
particular conflict and, therefore, in need of independence.
In some legal systems, all sentencing is specifically legally
mandated. In others, judges have wide sentencing discretion. Obviously,
there are many intermediate positions. Also, in some instances, judges
may find criminal defendants guilty of a lesser included offense and not
guilty of the most serious offense, may set the amount of damages, or
may frame remedial orders so as to subject the losing defendant to more
or less severe deprivations. 4 To some degree, sentencing decisions may
involve various considerations of public policy, such as ease of
enforcement or deterrent effect, but the dominant factor is likely to be
assessment of individual culpability and/or mitigation, and therefore,
seem to fall within the judicial realm to be shielded by judicial
independence.
III. THE ROLE OF APPELLATE COURT JUDGES
Appeals courts present quite a different problem from that of trial
courts. To be sure, much of what appellate courts do is simply review
what trial courts have done. Appellate judges act judicially, reviewing
the decisions trial judges make. However, appeals courts also do a great
deal of lawmaking, which is disguised and excused as "interpretation."
Both trial and appeals courts "interpret" statutory text, but the final say
4. See generally SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael Tonry
& Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
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in interpretation usually lies with appeals courts. Of course, great
oceans of fashionable continental literary theory hold that the true
meaning of all text lies in the hands, or minds, of the interpreters, not
the writers. Where the text is law and the interpreter is a court
endowed with legal authority, interpretation becomes not only literary
cleverness, but it also becomes lawmaking. Even without succumbing to
literary fashion, it is clear that the text of many statutes is written
generally, is sometimes incomplete, and is often deliberately ambiguous.
And the devil very often is in the details.
Whether or not particular judges want to make law, courts will
often determine the ultimate meaning of statutes, and consequently, the
specific impact of those statutes. Judges must interpret statutes in
order to decide cases according to preexisting legal rules. The legitimacy
of courts as independent, neutral conflict resolvers depends on judges
deciding disputes according to preexisting legal rules. 5 Therefore, judges
will discover and announce specific, preexisting legal rules even in
6
statutes that are very unclear, garbled, or ambiguous.
7
There is a well-known debate about precedent in civil law systems.
If court decisions are not treated as precedents, the legal outcomes of
particular cases will not have general legal effects, and thus will not be
true lawmaking.8 No matter the theory, civil law systems, in one way or
another, do treat high court interpretations as more or less precedential,
albeit not always openly.
If appeals courts make law, then appeals courts in democracies face
a special independence problem that is quite different than the
problems that prosecutors or trial courts face. Democracies may be more
or less majoritarian, but all democracies are grounded in a basic
premise that the laws are to be made by the people or their
representatives. Lawmakers are supposed to be dependent on the
electorate, as opposed to being independent. If judges make law, then
judicial independence is a very problematic value in a democracy.
In many legal systems, appeals courts not only review trial court
decisions, but also review actions of administrative agencies in a way
that sometimes constitutes lawmaking. Either in a disguised or open
5. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
1-64 (1981) (discussing the prototypical court that involves "(1) an independent judge
applying (2) preexisting legal norms after (3) adversary proceedings in order to achieve (4)
a dichotomous decision in which one of the parties was assigned the legal right and the
other found wrong.").
6. See generally Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155
(1994) (stating that judges exist in a paradox where they must make law and claim they
are basing their decisions on legal principles but still deny that they are making law).
7. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 5.
8. See generally id.
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form, such review is often substantive, as well as procedural. 9 The
reviewing court may hold that an agency's action violates a statute.10 In
such instances, the court substitutes its own interpretation of the
statute for that made by the agency." By using such formulas as ultra
vires, natural justice, proportionality, abuse of discretion, or arbitrary
and capricious, the court may simply be disagreeing with the policy
choices the agency has made. 12 In all of these instances, we simply see
rival lawmakers, administrative and judicial, at work, and therefore, a
problematic situation for independence.
Finally, courts exercising constitutional judicial review powers on
appeal or original jurisdiction may, even more conclusively, veto
legislative or administrative lawmaking, or they may substitute their
own. 13 Because constitutions tend to be even more generally worded
than statutes, judges engaged in constitutional interpretation are likely
to exercise great lawmaking powers. 14 These lawmaking powers are
likely to raise particular problems for democracy because the demosthat is the voters or the people-will find it more difficult to override
judicial constitutional lawmaking than judicial statutory lawmaking,
which can be overridden by further legislation. Thus, we actually
encounter at least four different levels of judicial independence
problems: prosecutorial, trial court, appeals court, and constitutional
court.
IV. RECENT CHALLENGES

Recently, problems of judicial independence have been rendered
more acute by four interrelated developments. First and foremost is the
proliferation of judicial institutions charged with constitutional review
defending division of powers principles and especially constitutional
bills of rights and their equivalents. 15 The great potential political
impact of judicial decisions of this kind, their risk of raising conflicts
between judges and the government or powerful, political movements,
9. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).

10. See generally id.
11. See generally id.
12. See generally id.
13. See generally ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000).

14. See generally id.
15. See generally RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008); STONE SWEET, supra note 13; Martin
Shapiro, The Globalization of Judicial Review, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 119 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996).
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their seeming finality, and their capacity to attract media attention
inevitably generate powerful threats to judicial independence, often
couched as pleas for judicial restraint and increased concerns for
judicial accountability.
The second development that has affected judicial independence is
the increasing tendency for parties unsuccessful at pursuing their goals
through the electoral, legislative, or administrative processes to seek
policy change by judicial decision-a movement sometimes referred to
as the "judicialization" or "juridification" of politics. 16 Here, the potential
political kickback from judicial intervention and the risk that, in
popular perception, the judges will be seen as just another bunch of
politicians subject to the same pressures as other politicians, is of
increasing concern. For this reason, accountability issues have come to
rival independence concerns.
The third development affecting judicial independence is the
growing tendency to employ litigation to seek not only general policy
benefits but also gratification of personal interests that has been labeled
"adversarial legalism."17 If judges are asked to settle more and more
medical malpractice complaints, patent disputes, and so on, they
necessarily become greater targets for outside manipulation by
particular interest groups such as doctors or high powered digital
technology entrepreneurs. The manipulation may take the form of
conventional corruption, political pressure, and/or launching a public
discourse of delegitimation. If the courts restructure political processes
and/or dictate major public policies, how will they become legitimated in
democracies in which political decisions belong to the people and their
elected representatives? Why should judges not be exposed to popular
control in democratic states?
The fourth development is the proliferation of national and
transnational long-arm jurisdictions that allow courts to assert
jurisdiction over persons now living in another place for events that may
have occurred in yet a third place at an earlier time. Such trials, 8 or
merely beginning prosecutions, may have serious, even dire,
consequences for persons and communities far beyond those of the
courts involved, whose home communities may be entirely unaffected.' 9
16. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICLALIZATION (2002).
17. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001); DANIEL R. KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).

18. A number of states now authorize their courts to hear "war crimes" or "tort" cases
involving events that occurred in other countries.
19. For instance, the prosecution in Spain of a former Chilean dictator contributed to
serious political disturbances in Chile.
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Those judges and communities may feel the warm glow of vindicating
human rights, while others may feel the glow of their homes burning in
the riots that the prosecutions have engendered.
Long-arm proliferation provides a happy hunting ground for
favorable
forum
shopping
by
national
and
transnational
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals who feel denied
justice in the communities where severe deprivations of human rights
have occurred. Such jurisdictional extensions may upset delicate
diplomatic negotiations. They may embarrass the home governments of
the asserting courts which may, precisely because of judicial
independence, have no power to control those courts. They may generate
serious political consequences in far distant countries whose complex
circumstances are far beyond the ken of the judges claiming jurisdiction.
Those judges may be entirely unaccountable for the often unpredictable
consequences they generate in those countries. Even without actual
prosecutions, the existence of such jurisdictions may lead dictators to
hold on until the bitter end at the cost of thousands of lives rather than
take their ill-gotten gains and retire to their distant, sun-drenched
villas.
Even the most independent judges experience at least some level of
personal accountability for the damage they may do in their home
communities simply because they reside in those communities. The
accountability issue becomes particularly acute when prosecutors and
judges are dealing with communities that they may never even visit.
The accountability problem is further aggravated when the law enforced
at a long arm's length is a vaguely-stated, rapidly-evolving law of
international human rights. This type of law invites and requires a high
degree of judicial lawmaking in a complex political realm that neither
judges nor anyone else understands very well.
V. THE INTERSECTION OF PROSECUTION AND THE POLITICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATS

In relatively developed democratic states, the leading traditional
problems of prosecutorial independence were potential excessive
favoritism to the state and corruption of the state. These former
problems engendered
arrangements for partially segregating
prosecutors from a ministry of justice or other direct executive control.
These arrangements include the semiautonomous United States
Attorney's offices within the U.S. federal government and the

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

incorporation of European prosecutors into an independent judiciary. 20
The U.S. system of independently elected state prosecutors and
attorneys general is another mode -of protection against executive
control. It may well be that any or all of these devices have been
relatively successful. Or, in the final analysis, such devices may matter
much less than a strongly held public value against politically inspired
prosecution and state repression.
The opposite danger that rich or otherwise powerful individuals and
interests can shield themselves against merited prosecution by
corrupting prosecutors is not really addressed by conventional
independence devices. Corrupting one prosecutor who works on her own
is obviously easier than corrupting one who is embedded in a whole
bureaucratic structure designed to supervise and hold accountable a
number of prosecutors. On the other hand, where partisan party politics
is pervasive in government administration, it may be harder to corrupt
an independent prosecutor than one who is part of a party-dominated
executive. The degree of corruption difficulty depends on how much the
parties are dominated by wealth, family, or other personal connections.
In places where prosecutors are chosen by partisan election,
prosecutorial corruption will depend on how much the parties have been
corrupted. In places where such elections are nonpartisan, the need to
finance election campaigns may undercut the anticorruption check that
popular elections are supposed to provide. Yet, prosecutorial election
systems do provide continuous, high incentives for the media and
prospective rival parties or individuals to monitor prosecutorial conduct.
Where organized crime is powerful and extraordinarily wealthy,
corruption may be anticipated. The Italian move to extremely
independent prosecutors surely has been a response to the earlier
21
corrupt connections between the mafia and elected politicians.
Paradoxically,
the subsequent assassinations
and
attempted
assassinations of Italian prosecutors are signs that prosecutorial
independence has worked against corruption. If prosecutors could be
bought, there would be no need to blow them up. Similarly, in a number
of countries, the wars waged between the government and drug cartels
would seem to indicate that even the enormous wealth of the drug lords
has not led to the level of corruption in the justice system that might
have been anticipated. For if that system were bought, it would not have
to be fought.

20. See generally GIUSEPPE DI FEDERICO, RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION
AND CAREER OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN EUROPE (2005).

21. See generally Adriana Alberti, Political Corruption and the Role of Public
Prosecutorsin Italy, 24 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 273 (1996).
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Two problems, both involving the intersection of prosecution and the
politics of constitutional democracies, are currently of particular
interest. The first problem occurs when there is a strong suspicion that
political chief executives, such as prime ministers or presidents, have
committed a crime. This problem is well illustrated in the United
States. In most American states, both local prosecutors and the
Attorney General, the latter having little or no control over local
prosecutors, are independently elected. Therefore, they are well placed
to independently investigate and prosecute local government and state
chief executives (mayors, governors, etc.).
Indeed, because many elected prosecutors and attorneys general see
their positions as stepping stones to higher political office, they have a
special interest in mounting high profile prosecutions. Prosecutors and
attorneys general gain high levels of name recognition among voters
because of these high profile prosecutions, and, thus, enhance their
chances of later running successfully for other offices. The very elected
status that renders prosecutors sufficiently independent to prosecute,
however, contains a strong threat to that independence. If the
prosecutor and the chief political executive are in the same political
party and the prosecutor anticipates running later for other elected
offices, he may be reluctant to weaken the party under whose banner he
wishes to run in the future by prosecuting one of that party's leading
figures. On the other hand, the election of prosecutors solves the
problem of democratic accountability.
At the U.S. federal government level, the Attorney General is
appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the president. The Attorney
General is the minister of justice in the president's Cabinet. He is also
the chief prosecutor, because prosecution is an executive, rather than
judicial, function. Thus, the Attorney General's position has always
been unclear. Is he "the president's lawyer," advising and representing
the chief executive and utilizing the best legal defenses of presidential
positions, or is the Attorney General, as chief prosecutor, bound to
independently prosecute even the highest officers of government should
they violate the law?
Currently, there is a great constitutional debate in the United
States over "unitary" theories of the presidency. 22 The debate questions
whether all the powers vested in the executive branch by the
Constitution and Congressional statutes "belong" to the sitting
president, or whether some can be vested independently in lesser
executive officers. Under the strictest unitary theory, the prosecution of

22. See generally Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 235 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
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the president would be an absurdity. The president would literally be
prosecuting himself, because it is the president who ultimately holds all
powers of the executive branch, including the Attorney General's power
to prosecute. Even without a unitary theory, the notion of a prosecutor
pursuing an accused who has the power to dismiss the prosecutor
appears absurd.
For the aforementioned reasons, in the instance of the Watergate
scandal, which gravely implicated the president, the United States
resorted to a major deviation from American traditions, and arguably an
unconstitutional one, with the creation by statute of a special prosecutor
who would be partially independent of executive branch control. The
result was a continuing, unresolved clash between presidential and
congressionally-mandated prosecutorial authority, and ultimately the
resignation of a president under threat of impeachment.
Central to the debate over the creation of a special prosecutor was
the problem of accountability, particularly the accountability of a
and
highly
politically-charged
working
on
prosecutor
electorally-significant matters. This concern was largely responsible for
giving that office a very limited mandate and a short existence. The
problem was not solved, and the special prosecutor's office was
short-lived.
All of this brings us to what might well be called the Italian
problem. Italian prosecutors have achieved a degree of independence
unrivaled elsewhere and thus an unrivaled freedom from accountability.
For very good reasons having to do with the powers of the Mafia and its
interconnection with both elected and appointed government officials,
crusading prosecutors striking at organized crime and government
23
figures became Italian action heroes.
The great problem that arises is that the initiation of prosecution or
even of investigation that may lead to prosecution, particularly when it
occurs during the political campaigns preceding elections, can give
enormous partisan electoral advantage to the opponents of those
candidates under prosecutorial scrutiny. 24 And, inevitably, those under
prosecutorial scrutiny will defend themselves by claiming that the
prosecutors are either politically-motivated or driven by motives of
personal self-aggrandizement. Particular prosecutors become both
culture heroes and culture villains. They are, at times, independent
forces of the rule of law against the corruption of politics, and at other
25
times, part of that very corruption.

23. See generally Alberti, supra note 21.
24. See generally id.
25. See generally id.
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The problem of accountability remains acute. Extreme independence
in the absence of effective accountability actually leads to a crisis of
independence. As the prosecutors become deeply embroiled in their
party and electorally-oriented politics, and the only available response
to their actions is to publicly
attack
their actions
as
politically-motivated, the whole prosecutorial office tends to be
delegitimized and public support, on which independence ultimately
rests, is eroded.
Thus, neither the American style of direct electoral accountability,
nor the Italian style of isolation from nearly all accountability, appears
to resolve the independence-accountability paradox for prosecutors.
VI. INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRIAL COURT JUDGES
A range of recruitment, appointment, education, preservice and
in-service training, and advancement arrangements designed to create
judicial esprit de corps and separation from government and
administration have been relatively successful in establishing and
maintaining judicial independence in continental Europe. Judicial
accountability, however, remains far more problematic. Individual
judges are, to a degree, held accountable to the collectivity of judges,
and in some countries, institutionalized in supreme judicial councils
that include some nonjudicial members. 26 Most countries have
individual complaint procedures for judges comparable to those for other
27
civil servants.
The U.S. federal and state governments remain the great outlier. In
the United States, one encounters a very large and complex spectrum of
selection practices, which include: partisan election of trial judges for
short terms; nonpartisan elections; yes-no plebiscites in which only the
incumbent's name appears on the ballot; and various methods of
appointment by state governors and the president, usually with
participation by the upper house of the legislature and often with
nominating or vetting roles assigned to professional legal associations or
special commissions.
All of these complexities and variations reflect the American sense
of paradox over judicial independence and accountability and show
greater sensitivity to accountability issues than in Europe. Yet, even in
the most electorally-oriented state systems within the United States,
voters nearly always reelect incumbent judges and do so not because
26. See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:

CRITICAL

PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).

27. See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of JapaneseJudges, 25 KOBE U.
L. REV. 45 (1991) (Japan).
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they know anything about the incumbents or the challengers, or even
28
recognize their names, but because the incumbents are incumbent.
29
Very few incumbent judges have lost office. The few states that have
used partisan elections have shown great uneasiness in using them and
have sometimes abandoned them when real Republican versus
Democratic judicial election campaigning arose. 30 In general, U.S.
citizens seem to believe that judges should be chosen on a merit basis,
but that some opportunity should be retained to oust particular judges
at stated intervals when a judge's actions have been so notably bad as to
31
attract lasting public disapproval.
Recently, the problem of judicial elections in the United States has
taken on new urgency, largely as the result of the "adversarial legalism"
noted earlier. Perhaps because of the jury system, the contingent fee
system, the use of punitive damages, and the relative efficiency of U.S.
courts, U.S. citizens and NGOs have become prone to sue business
enterprises both to gain compensation for .injuries inflicted and to
supplement or replace government regulatory efforts deemed
inadequate. Congress and state legislatures regularly encourage such
litigation by enacting statutory provisions that authorize and encourage
private lawsuits to enforce regulatory laws. 32 The number and detail of
those regulatory laws have greatly increased in recent years in response
to environmental, health, safety, discrimination, and consumer
protection concerns. The government itself enforces these laws through
litigation in trial courts.
Although most of the cases involving large sums of money or major
regulatory demands will go on to appellate courts, trial court fact
findings and the amount of damages or fines may have a decisive impact
on final outcomes. Plaintiff failure at trial will discourage other
plaintiffs from coming forward.
Thus, the business community, faced with the risk of frequent and
large adverse judgments, has now discovered a very strong interest in
just who gets to be and stay a trial court judge. Previously, an
incumbent judge up for reelection might face no opposition or only
nominal opposition. 33 Given voter preferences for incumbents, the mere
word incumbent next to his or her name on the ballot would insure
28. See generally JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: SURPRISING
CAMPAIGNING ON JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY (2012).

EFFECTS OF

29. See generally id.
30. See generally id.
31. See generally id.
32. For example, most state and federal employment discrimination laws provide for
private right of action.
33. See generally GIBSON, supra note 28; Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and
JudicialIndependence: The Voter's Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2003).
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reelection.3 4 Now business interests are beginning to identify
"antibusiness" judges, recruit high quality candidates to oppose them,
and spend money on judicial election campaigns. Incumbent judges find
themselves needing to spend money to counter their opponents'
campaign spending. Incumbent judges are unlikely to have money of
their own to spend because it is difficult for a sitting judge to solicit or
even simply accept donations.
The
whole
U.S.
pragmatic
compromise
on
the
independence-accountability problem, in which the incumbent judge is
35
always reelected absent flagrant misconduct, is called into question.
Undoubtedly, there will be mounting pressure to move away from the
election of trial judges. 36 There is also increasing concern about recusal
norms as they relate to parties in a case who have made judicial
campaign contributions.
Indeed there has always been a certain perversity of practice in the
United States. In most states that elect judges, trial court judges serve
for shorter terms than appeals judges. In some states, higher court
judges are appointed and lower court judges are elected. Yet, if the
rationale for electing judges is that they are lawmakers and that
lawmakers should be elected in a democracy, higher court judges should
be subject to more rigorous election requirements because they mix
more lawmaking in with their dispute resolution than trial courts.
Where career judiciaries exist and a central authority promotes and
assigns judges to levels and locations of courts, trial court judicial
independence may be threatened-lower court judges may seek to curry
favor with their career controllers by deciding cases as those controllers
might wish them to be decided. Fear of this has often led to moving
judicial career control out of ministries of justice and into judicial
corporate bodies, usually dominated by higher court judges. 37 Yet, then
the fear arises that the judicial independence of lower court judges may
be compromised because lower court judges will decide cases in ways
that higher court judges who control their careers may desire.
Why is it considered a compromise of judicial independence if lower
court judges have high incentives to obey higher court judges? It is
because of the civil law orthodoxy that, unlike the common law, civil law

34. See generally Baum, supra note 33.
35. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial
Independence and Retention Elections, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 18-19 (2010) (arguing that
judicial retention elections create pressure for judges to cater to public opinion on pressing
legal issues).
36. See id.
37. See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN THE AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 26.
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does not know precedent. 38 Every judge, in every case, is to go back to
the words of the relevant legal text, usually a code provision or statute,
as the sole authority for the case to be decided. If this practice of
utilizing precedent is really correct, then no judge, no matter how low in
the judicial hierarchy, should decide a case on the basis of how a judicial
superior would wish it to be decided. The judge must make an
independent, text-driven decision without fear that his career will suffer
for it. This is why the French have the practice of cassation,3 9 in which,
while a lower court decision is annulled on appeal, the case returns to
that lower court for a new, independent judgment.
The French practice is, however, not really the practice, and so the
problem is not really a problem. Even French law teachers now
recognize that high court decisions sometimes make law, and that even
in civil law systems the precedential value of higher court decisions
must be recognized by lower courts if there is to be any uniformity,
stability, and predictability in the law applied by the courts.
Collections of leading decisions have now appeared among the law
texts taught to law students in many European states. Civil law trial
judges now ignore the law propounded by higher courts at their peril.
Whether that peril should consist only of cassation of their
nonconforming decisions or manifest in their professional evaluations
and other influences on their appointments to higher and more
desirable judicial posts is in debate. To define judicial independence in
terms of the total isolation of trial court judges from the need to follow
the pronouncements of law issued by their appeals courts runs against
the reality of the way civil law systems actually operate. Indeed, part of
judicial accountability is the demand that lower court judges follow the
law announced by higher courts. Of course, if high courts in
authoritarian states are politically dominated, then trial court
independence from high courts would be a step in the right direction.
VII. THE SCOPE OF APPEALS COURT ACCOUNTABILITY

We begin here with the premise that appeals courts make law. Even
on appeal, perhaps well over 90 percent of cases have a single, correct
outcome derived by mere application of well-settled statutory or case
law. Nevertheless, there are some cases in which the previous state of
the law is ambiguous, self-contradictory, or nonexistent. In those
38. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 5.
39. Cassationis a part of French law in which a decision is annulled or reversed with
sovereign authority, thus "breaking the force and validity of a judgment." What is
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instances, the courts must, nonetheless, say what the law is, or, in other
words, make the law. Precisely because unsettled legal issues tend to
generate appeals, appeals courts will do more lawmaking than trial
courts.
If the ratio of judicial independence to accountability should vary
corresponding to the ratio of judicial conflict resolution to judicial
lawmaking, then particular problems of accountability arise for
appellate courts. Other than U.S. legal cultures, there does not appear
to be much inclination on the part of other legal cultures to move toward
judicial elections. Except on constitutional issues, many appeals courts
are not held accountable, even to other judges. Highest courts, or courts
with final or exclusive constitutional judicial powers, are typically
accountable only through impeachment. There appears to be only
mutual accountability of judges to one another provided by relatively
large appellate panels. Although appellate work product is likely to
come under some scrutiny and criticism by the academic legal
community, overall accountability appears quite weak.
Perhaps here, too, however, there is a pseudo problem. No matter
what the hymns to judicial independence are, when courts make law by
"interpreting" or "applying" statutory law, they are not, and are not
supposed to be, independent, but rather totally dependent agents of the
legislature. Should it wish to, the legislature could always amend the
judicially interpreted statute to "correct" the court's "misinterpretation"
of the original statutory language.
Judicial independence means that courts should be shielded from
intervention by individual legislators or even the legislature as a whole
as to particular cases. 40 However, independence does not preclude the
legislature from changing future judicial outcomes by amending the
general language of the statute. As courts of law, courts are supposed to
be independent of legislative intervention as to each particular case
before them, but not as to future cases, because the legislature is fully
entitled to intervene by amending the statute.
Thus, judicial lawmaking by appellate courts is accountable to the
elected legislatures at least in its future impact. There is, however, a
major caveat. The legislatures of some fully developed democracies
sometimes experience low legislative efficiency-that is, they have
trouble passing laws quickly or at all. This inefficiency may result from
constitutional checks and balances such as two house legislatures or
from electoral and political dynamics that lead to weak, multiparty
40. See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH, supra note 1; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note
1; TARR, supra note 1; THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND

THE PUBLIC, supra note 1; SOLLENBERGER, supra note 1; Carrington, supra note 1.
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coalition governments that find it difficult to attain majority votes in the
legislature for their proposed statutes. Under such conditions, appellate
courts and administrative bureaucracies are likely to promulgate much
of the new law that needs to be made. This lawmaking will then be
subject to little legislative accountability. A legislature that found it
hard to make law in the first place is also likely to find it hard to make
law to "correct" the lawmaking that the courts and the bureaucracies
have made for it.
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS As A MEANS TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE 41
Many of the non-English speaking countries have a separate or
partially separate system of administrative courts. Even the
English-speaking
countries
have proliferated
many
different
administrative tribunals. 42 There is a general and longterm tendency to
endow these courts and tribunals with a high degree of independence
even in the many countries that acknowledge that they are, and ought
to be, somehow part of administration. 43 In the United States, for
instance, federal hearing officers have won for themselves the title of
administrative law judge. Even where such administrative judges are
not part of a rigorously separated administrative court system, they are
frequently relatively insulated from the rest of the administrative
agencies in which they work. For instance, persons who have assisted in
the administrative agency's investigation of a particular person or
enterprise are often prohibited from serving as hearing officers in the
44
resulting trial-like procedure.
In general, English-speaking countries have been somewhat
suspicious of specialized administrative courts or other specialized
courts, as opposed to courts of general jurisdiction. 45 Even as these
countries have increasingly turned to administrative tribunals, they
have tended to provide for appeal from the tribunals to the regular
courts. The general argument is that no matter what the formal
separation is, administrative law and specialized court judges find
themselves constantly and almost exclusively engaged in cases in which
the government seeks to enforce the law to serve the public or general

41. For a discussion on the structure and practices of administrative courts and
tribunals, see generally COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman &
Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010).
42. See generally id.
43. See generally id.
44. See generally id.
45. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS (2011).
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interest while the private sector opponent seeks its own private
advantage by avoiding, even if not evading, the law.
It is argued that in such a context, administrative law judges, who
are government officers and public servants themselves, are likely to
internalize pro-government perspectives and in this sense become
non-independent. Where an entirely separate system of administrative
courts exists, the pro-government perspective will not be held in check
by appeal. For such an appeal will be to still more judges of the same
pro-government inclination as the initial hearing officer or
administrative law trial judge.
The civil law response to this situation is highlighted by the high
esteem in which councils of state are held in the southern European
tier. The response is to have administrative law judicial cadres and
judges of specialized courts combine the specific expert knowledge
needed to understand government operations-that judges of general
jurisdiction do not have-with an elite, professional, and legal esprit de
corps that emboldens them to active intervention in administrative
affairs. Certainly, the very high levels of expert knowledge needed to
understand, let alone control, government regulation of an increasingly
high-tech world would seem to favor specialized rather than generalist
administrative judicial review bodies and specialized courts of first
46
instance.
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY
It has been widely recognized that constitutional courts 47 present
special problems of judicial independence because of the inevitably
political impact of their decisions because the typical, generally worded
language of constitutions gives their judicial interpreters even greater
lawmaking discretion than arises in much statutory interpretation, and
because their decisions are more "final" than those of judges
interpreting statutes. Legislators cannot "correct" faulty judicial
interpretations of constitutional provisions as they can those of statutes
by amending or repealing the statute through the normal legislative
process. It has increasingly been argued that most constitutional
decisions come down to judicial judgments of the reasonableness or
proportionality of government actions by balancing constitutional values
46. See generally id.; F. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative
Agencies: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534 (2000).
47. Developed states generally follow the U.S. model in which all courts or the highest
regular appeals courts have jurisdiction over constitutional questions or the "Kelsenian"
model in which a single, separate constitutional court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over
such questions. See generally STONE SWEET, supra note 13.
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against government public policy goals. 48 There could hardly be an
instance of greater judicial discretion.
Fierce debates over the compatibility of constitutional judicial
review and democracy have repeatedly been waged on both sides of the
Atlantic Ocean. Perhaps the greatest historical threat to judicial
independence in a fully developed democracy, Franklin D. Roosevelt's
court packing scheme in the United States, was engendered by the
Supreme Court's constitutional decisions. Similar proposals are afloat
today. Major crises of judicial independence have occurred in developing
democracies as a result of constitutional court decisions with high
political impact, although some of these crises spring from decisions
based on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds.
Leaving election decisions aside, there are three areas of
constitutional decision-making that tend to generate threats to judicial
independence. The first area consists of federalism decisions involving
the constitutional allocation of powers between a central government
and its member states. In general, the court's independence in making
such decisions, whether they favor the central government or member
state governments, is likely to survive even heated attacks. Federalisms
are cartels in which the most favorable position for any member is that
all other members obey the rules while it cheats. For instance, it will be
strongly in the interest of a coal producing member state to fan imports
of coal from other states-that is, to cheat on an interstate commerce or
"free trade" clause, while all other states obey the clause by allowing
entry of coal from the cheating state to its own internal market. Thus,
the survival of the cartel depends on strong surveillance and repression
of cheating.
Federalism review by a constitutional court is an obvious and
usually effective anticheating mechanism. Thus, conflicts between the
court and any one member state are likely to result in support of the
court by all other member states. The historical experiences of the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice
are very instructive in this regard. 49 Yet, occurrences in the former
Soviet Empire, in Canada, and in the United States during the Civil
War suggest that constitutional courts enforcing federalism may come

48. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 73-76 (2008). See Martin Shapiro,
Judicial Review Global, in LA CIENCIA DEL DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL [THE
SCIENCE OF PROCEDURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 889, 890 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor &

Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea eds., 2008) (Mex.) (describing how courts across the globe
apply a proportionality balancing test).
49. See generally A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2009).
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under extreme stress when one or more members of the federal cartel
prefers dissolution. The Canadian "Notwithstanding" Clause, which
allows member state legislatures to override some adverse central
constitutional court decisions, also indicates the strong threat to
independence that federalism cases may entail. 50
A second area of potential conflict involves division of powers.
Jurisdiction over the constitutional division of powers within the central
government potentially pits constitutional courts against legislative or
executive branches with far more immediate and concrete powers than
those of the judiciary. 51 The risk that exercises of judicial independence
that produce decisions unfavorable to the powers of the legislature or
executive will generate reprisals is obvious. In most developed
democracies, constitutional courts have deliberately avoided open
clashes with the executive branch over the limits of executive authority
and have been cautious in refereeing disputes between executive and
legislative branches, leaving them largely to openly political processes.
In developing democracies, overweening executives may pose serious
threats to the constitutional division of powers, and courts have
sometimes become, perhaps unavoidably, less cautious than they might
have been in upholding constitutional limitations on assertions of
executive power. In such instances, judicial independence may be
seriously threatened, either by executive intervention in a particular
case or by executive attacks on judges or on the judicial institution.
The third area of potential conflict is individual rights. Where a
court strikes down legislation on rights grounds, issues of judicial
thwarting of the majority and of judicial, democratic accountability rise
dramatically. In these instances, the court openly pits itself against
democratically elected governments and purports to speak with finality.
This scenario would appear to be the most dangerous situation any
court, constitutional or otherwise, could face.
There have been two responses to this perceived problem. 52 The first
is that of "judicial self-restraint," in which the judges are urged to be
extremely cautious or even abandon judicial review altogether. 53 To be
sure, motives here are mixed. Some proponents of judicial self-restraint
are simply opposed to the judicial elaboration of new individual rights.
Others are dedicated to unlimited majoritarian democracy. Many

50. See generally LAw, POLITICS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CANADA (F.L. Morton
ed., 3d ed. 2002).
51. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

52. This perceived problem is generated by judicial vetoes of legislation enacted by
elected legislatures but possibly infringing on constitutionally protected rights.
53. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1964).
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proponents, however, see judicial self-restraint as a pragmatic device
protecting constitutional courts from public attack for decisions
thwarting strong public desires expressed in legislation. 54 These
proponents see constitutional review related to rights as the most
dangerous judicial activity in terms of potentially engendering political
55
invasions of judicial independence.
Certainly, the most successful constitutional courts have exhibited a
certain strategic sense concerning when to, and when not to, press
forward vigorously on rights issues. Those who are not self-restrainers
argue that the global enthusiasm for human rights is so great that it
does, and will, protect rights-ambitious courts. 56 They point to the
extraordinary new enthusiasm for constitutional bills of rights and their
equivalents, and for judicial protection of those rights in both the nation
states of Eastern Europe and transnational institutions.5 7 The
European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the
German and Italian Constitutional Courts, and the constitutional courts
58
of other EU member states have flourished as rights protectors.
France has recently experienced a virtual revolution in its judicial
institutions and processes for protecting human rights. 59 Israel has
vigorous constitutional rights review even without a formal
60
constitutional bill of rights.
There has been a globalization of constitutional bills of rights and
constitutional judicial rights review. 61 Nevertheless, the enthusiasm for
rights may appear to be sufficient enough to support vigorous judicial
implementation and even expansion of constitutional rights, at least in
developed democracies, without unreasonable risks of invasion into
judicial independence.
The problem of democratic accountability for independent
constitutional courts does not appear a wholly insolvable one in spite of
the "finality" of constitutional decisions. The old American folk wisdom
that the Supreme Court follows the election returns, or that the Court
never strays far from the governing political coalition, appears roughly
54. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1978).

55. See generally id.
56. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).

57.
58.
J.H.H.
59.

See generally id.
See generally THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Griinne de Bdrca &
Weiler eds., 2011).
See generally ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE

CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992).
60. See generally SUZIE NAvOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (2007).
61. See generally THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 58.
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true on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The separate, and distinctly
political, appointment processes for constitutional court judges and term
limits provide a pragmatic balance between independence and
accountability. The wide range of ease or difficulty in constitution
amending processes among Western polities signals continuing concerns
for such pragmatic adjustments.
The uneasiness over a small body of nonelected persons, chosen
largely from a rather narrow stratum of society, making fundamental,
and in some sense final, decisions of public policy is not going to go
away. Neither is the enthusiasm for the "constitutional" aspect of
"constitutional democracy," nor for "rights" and for some means of
enforcing them. The paradox of independence and accountability is not
going to go away.
X. INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In summary, if we take a global view of more or less fully developed
democracies, we encounter the basic paradox of judicial independence
everywhere. The fundamental task of courts is conflict resolution which,
to be successful, requires judicial independence. 62 Successful conflict
resolution also requires some quantum of judicial lawmaking because
judicially imposed resolutions are most easily accepted when they
appear to be the product of preexisting legal rules. 63 Judges, therefore,
will "interpret" or make such rules when deciding cases where a
sufficiently applicable rule is not otherwise provided. 64 In a democratic
polity, such lawmaking demands some degree of democratic
accountability.
There is a wide array of pragmatic, never wholly satisfactory, and
frequently altered responses to the paradox. There is judicial selection
by a wide array of electoral arrangements, ranging from partisan
elections to short terms of office to long terms followed by yes-no
plebiscites for further terms. Alternatively, judicial selection may be by
appointment by political executives-with or without legislative
confirmation--by a judicial council composed of judges and lay
members, or by cooption by the incumbent judges. Appointments may be
either from a universal-although typically professionally qualifiedpool, from a pool of candidates preselected either by special
qualifications (e.g. law professors, senior practitioners, government
lawyers of a certain rank), by civil service style examinations, or by

62. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 5.
63. See generally id.
64. See generally id.
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some special body representing particular interests. The organized bar
may or may not play a part in judicial selection.
Similarly, individual judicial career trajectories may be controlled
by a ministry of justice headed by a political appointee or by a judicial
council, or they may be nonexistent in the sense that a judge appointed
to any particular court may have no expectation of moving from it to
another. At one extreme is the Italian judicial prosecutor arrangement
referred to earlier Section V.
In democracies that have institutionalized constitutional judicial
review, the sporadic debates that arise over the democratic legitimacy of
such review are clear evidence of the difficulty of resolving or even
compromising the independence-accountability paradox. In addition to
the independence-accountability paradox that bedevils democratic
regimes, a second paradox, noted earlier, is particularly relevant to
authoritarian regimes and regimes that are tentatively moving toward
democracy. Judicial independence should be a goal for all regimes, but
each regime should also have the goal that the courts decide cases
legally rather than arbitrarily. Yet courts of law are not independent;
they are the agents or dependents of whoever makes the law. There has
been much emphasis on the possibility that even highly protective
constitutional and statutory rights guarantees may be meaningless in
the absence of a truly independent judiciary to enforce them. Thus,
there is tremendous stress on independence as a definitional
characteristic of courts.
That being said, there are darker aspects of this scenario worth
considering. First, a truly independent judiciary may garner a strong
popular perception of institutional legitimacy. If, however, such a
judiciary is part of an authoritarian, repressive regime, it lends its
legitimacy to the perceived institutional legitimacy of the authoritarian
regime itself. Second, a truly independent judiciary, acting according to
the rule of law, lends not only its legitimacy, but also its implementation
facilities to the laws, even if those laws are repressive, exploitative, or
advantageous to certain political, economic, or social interests. A
well-nurtured global myth of judicial independence obscures the reality
that courts of law are agents of a principal and that the principal may
be an authoritarian, repressive regime. 65 The independence flag
contributes to the perceived legitimacy of whatever law the courts
enforce. A terrible law sounds better in the mouth of the "independent"
judge than in the mouth of a political administrator, and everything

65. See generally RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES,
supra note 15.
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about the judges' training and institutional interests leads them to
make it sound as good as they can.
Third, lawyers, and particularly judges, love procedure. Even a
substantively very bad law is somewhat less bad if it is procedurally
fair. Yet, the decision by an independent court that the fair procedures
required by a statute have been followed may provide a
legitimacy-enhancing judicial imprimatur to a law that is substantively
horrendous. For instance, laws that empower a government to severely
impair the rights or interests of particular groups in the interest of the
politically dominant may well be upheld by an independent court on
procedural grounds where consultation has taken place. Yet, the court's
procedural approval will almost unavoidably be publicly read as a
general approval, thus providing added legitimacy to the law. 66 Along
similar lines, no matter how much the U.S. Supreme Court insists that
when it finds a statute to be constitutional it is not necessarily saying
that the statute is a good thing, the headlines always say otherwise. The
difference between "upholding" and "approving" is not one easily
grasped by even the attentive public.
As the study of law and courts moves further and further into the
realm of authoritarian regimes, it is clear that support for judicial
independence is a two-edged sword. Authoritarian regimes can employ
the myth and even the reality of judicial independence to legitimize
their invasions of human rights. 67 The combination of over-generalized
slogans of rule of law, courts of law, and judicial independence is an
invitation to authoritarian regimes to disguise their abusive practices in
judicial draperies. On the other hand, a well-established tradition of
judicial independence may assist a transition from colonial to
68
democratic rule.
CONCLUSION

Anyone desiring absolute judicial independence can easily imagine
the institutional arrangements to achieve it, although even these
arrangements would be ineffective in the absence of strongly held
popular and elite values of independence. Judges would be appointed by
cooption by the sitting judges. Each judge would serve until a fixed
retirement age in the office to which he was initially appointed with
66. I am indebted to Pablo Reuda for highlighting this point.
67. See generally RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES,

supra note 15.
68. See generally JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAw (2008) (describing how

the courts in apartheid South Africa resisted the apartheid state by applying basic
principles of English common law).
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increases in salary based solely on length of service. Case assignment
would be random. Ex parte communication and any gifts would be
banned. Judges might only be dismissed for conviction of a serious crime
in regular criminal proceedings. All of these things would be
constitutionally guaranteed and the constitution would be very difficult
to amend. Yet, given the extent to which contemporary judges make
law, it is hard to see how even those who believe that majority rule and
electoral democracy should be severely constitutionally limited could
support such an extreme government of judges.
It is also easy to imagine a set of institutions supporting complete,
political accountability for judges. Either all judicial offices would be
filled by the elected chief political executive and all judges would serve
at his favor, or all judicial offices would be filled in the same manner as
seats in the house of the legislature. There seems to be no substantial
body of opinion devoted to this degree of democratization of the
judiciary. Those strongly opposed to judicial lawmaking typically seek to
limit it as much as possible rather than subject it to strict electoral
accountability.
One reason, or rather set of reasons, that judicial independence is
difficult to achieve is that all good government is difficult to achieve, no
matter what formal political institutions are established. Another
reason, however, is that hardly anyone would want absolute judicial
independence. We must all settle for one of the large varieties of mixes
of independence and accountability that various developed, democratic
states have adopted, none of which is entirely satisfactory.

